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We can now outsource data backup to third-party cloud stor-
age services so as to reduce data management costs. However, 
security concerns arise in terms of ensuring the privacy and in-
tegrity of outsourced data. We design and implement FADE, a 
cloud storage system that enforces access control of active data 
and protects deleted data wi th policy-based file assured deletion. 
FADE is built upon a set of cryptographic key operations that 
are maintained by a quorum of key management entities, and 
encrypts outsourced data files to guarantee their privacy and 
integrity. I t uses file access policies to provide a fine-grained 
control of how active files are accessible, and assuredly deletes 
files to make them unrecoverable to anyone upon revocations 
i 
of file access policies. In particular, FADE acts as an overlay 
system that works seamlessly atop today's cloud storage ser-
vices. To demonstrate this objective, we implement a work-
ing prototype of FADE atop Amazon S3, one of today's cloud 
storage services, and empirically show that FADE provides se-
curity protection for outsourced data wi th a minimal trade-off 
of performance overhead. Our work provides insights of how 
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Cloud storage is a new business solution for data outsourcing, as 
it offers an abstraction of infinite storage space for clients to host 
data in a pay-as-you-go manner [4]. Today there are a number 
of third-party cloud storage providers that offer cloud storage 
services, such as Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) 
3] and Windows Azure [35]. Cloud storage helps enterprises and 
government agencies significantly reduce their financial overhead 
of data management, as they can now archive their data to the 
cloud rather than maintain data centers on their own. For ex-
ample, SmugMug [27], a photo sharing website, chose to host 
terabytes of photos on Amazon S3 in 2006 and saved thousands 
of dollars on the maintenance of storage devices [2]. Apart from 
enterprises, individuals can also archive their personal data to 
the cloud using tools like Dropbox [8]. In particular, w i th the 
1 
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advent of smart phones, we expect that more people wi l l use 
Dropbox-like tools to move audio/video files from their smart-
phones to the cloud in order to make effective use of the storage 
space of their smartphones, which have l imited storage resources 
in general. 
However, security concerns become relevant as we now out-
source the storage of possibly sensitive data to th i rd parities. 
There are two specific security concerns that we are interested 
in. First, we need to provide guarantees of access control, in 
which we must ensure that only authorized parties can access the 
outsourced data on the cloud. In particular, we must prohibit 
third-party cloud storage providers from mining any sensitive in-
formation of their clients' data for their own marketing purposes. 
Second, it is important to provide guarantees of assured dele-
t 漏 , m e a n i n g that outsourced data is permanently inaccessible 
to anybody (including the data owner) upon requests of deletion 
of data. Assured deletion is useful in some scenarios. For exam-
ple, a company has archived millions of email messages among 
its employees and customers on the cloud, and later decides to 
delete them to avoid leakage of sensitive data. The challenge 
here is that we have to trust cloud storage providers to actually 
delete data, but they may be reluctant in doing so [25]. Also, 
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cloud storage providers typically keep multiple backup copies 
of data for rel iabil i ty reasons. I t is uncertain, to cloud clients, 
whether cloud providers can reliably remove all backup copies 
upon requests of deletion. Keeping data permanently is undesir-
able, as data may be unexpectedly disclosed in the future due to 
malicious attacks on the cloud or careless management of cloud 
operators. 
Today's cloud storage providers only provide l imited forms of 
security protection for the data stored in their infrastructures. 
For example, they mainly protect data files of a client w i th a 
single access key (e.g., in Amazon S3), but the client cannot 
customize who can access the data, or when the data is acces-
sible. Also, to the best of our knowledge, none of today's cloud 
storage providers provide guarantees of assured deletion of data 
files. 
The security concerns motivate us, as cloud clients, to have 
a system that can enforce access control and assured deletion of 
outsourced data on the cloud m a fine-grained manner. How-
ever，building such a system is a difficult task, especially when 
i t involves protocol or hardware changes in cloud storage infras-
tructures that are externally owned and managed by third-party 
cloud providers. Thus, i t is necessary to design a secure overlay 
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cloud storage system that can be overlaid and work seamlessly 
atop existing cloud storage services. 
In this thesis, we present FADE，a secure overlay cloud stor-
age system that provides fine-grained access control and assured 
deletion for outsourced data on the cloud, while working seam-
lessly atop today's cloud storage services. In FADE, active data 
files that remain on the cloud are associated w i th a set of user-
defined file access policies (e.g., t ime expiration, read/wri te per-
missions of authorized users), such that data files are accessible 
only to users who satisfy the file access policies. In addition, 
FADE generalizes time-based file assured deletion [20, 10] (i.e., 
data files are assuredly deleted upon time expiration) into a more 
fine-grained approach called policy-based file assured deletion, in 
which data files are assuredly deleted when the associated file 
access policies are revoked and become obsolete. The design in-
tu i t ion of FADE is to decouple the management of encrypted 
data and cryptographic keys, such that encrypted data remains 
on third-party (untrusted) cloud storage providers, while cryp-
tographic keys are independently maintained and operated by 
a quorum of key managers that altogether form trustworthi-
ness. To provide guarantees of access control and assured dele-
tion, FADE leverages off-the-shelf cryptographic schemes includ-
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ing threshold secret sharing [26] and attribute-based enciyp-
t ion [24, 6, 11, 22], and performs various cryptographic key 
operations that provide security protection for basic file up-
load/download operations. We implement a prototype of FADE 
to just i fy its feasibility, and export a set of l ibrary APIs that 
can be used, as a value-added security service, to enhance the 
security properties of general data outsourcing applications. 
In summary, this thesis makes the following contributions: 
• We propose a new policy-based file assured deletion scheme 
that reliably deletes files wi th regard to revoked file access 
policies. In this context, we design the key management 
schemes for various file manipulation operations, such that 
we provide a fine-grained control of access control and as-
sured deletion for our outsourced data. 
• We implement a working prototype of FADE atop Amazon 
S3. Our implementation of FADE exports a set of A P I in-
terfaces that can be adapted into different data outsourcing 
applications. 
• We empirically evaluate the performance overhead of FADE 
atop Amazon S3. Using experiments in a realistic network 
environment, we show the feasibility of FADE in improving 
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the security protection of data storage on the cloud. 
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, 
we describe and motivate the concept of policy-based file assured 
deletion, a major building block of FADE. In Chapter 3, we 
present the basic design of FADE and its related cryptographic 
key operations. In Chapter 4, we present the extensions that 
we include in FADE. In Chapter 5, we explain the implemen-
tat ion details of FADE. In Chapter 6, we evaluate FADE atop 
Amazon S3. In Chapter 7, we review related work on protecting 
outsourced data storage. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes. 
Chapter 2 
Policy-based File Assured 
Deletion 
FADE seeks to achieve both access control and assured deletion 
for outsourced data. The design of FADE is centered around 
the concept of policy-based file assured deletion. We first review 
time-based file assured deletion proposed in earlier work. We 
then explain the more general concept policy-based file assured 
deletion and motivate why it is important in certain scenarios. 
2.1 Background 
Time-based file assured deletion, which is first introduced in [20], 
means that files can be securely deleted and remain permanently 
inaccessible after a pre-defined duration. The main idea is that 
a file is encrypted wi th a data key, and this data key is further 
7 
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encrypted wi th a control key that is maintained by a separate 
key manager (known as Ephemerizer [20]). The key manager is 
a server that is responsible for cryptographic key management. 
In [20], the control key is time-based, meaning that i t wi l l be 
completely removed by the key manager when an expiration 
time is reached, where the expiration time is specified when 
the file is first declared. Without the control key, the data key 
and hence the data file remain encrypted and are deemed to be 
inaccessible. Thus, the main security property of file assured 
deletion is that even if a cloud provider does not remove expired 
file copies from its storage, those files remain encrypted and 
unrecoverable. 
An open issue in the work [20] is that i t is uncertain that 
whether time-based file assured deletion is feasible in practice, 
as there is no empirical evaluation. Later, the idea of time-based 
file assured deletion is prototyped in Vanish [10]. Vanish divides 
a data key into multiple key shares, which are then stored in 
different nodes of a public Peer-to-Peer Distr ibuted Hash Table 
(P2P DHT) system. Nodes remove the key shares that reside 
in their caches for a fixed time period. I f a file needs to remain 
accessible after the time period, then the file owner needs to 
update the key shares in node caches. Since Vanish is buil t on 
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the cache-aging mechanism in the P2P DHT, it is difficult to 
generalize the idea from time-based deletion to a fine-grained 
control of assured deletion wi th respect to different file access 
policies. We elaborate this issue in the following section. 
2.2 Policy-based Deletion 
We now generalize time-based deletion to policy-based deletion 
as follows. We associate each file wi th a single atomic file access 
Polwy (or policy for short), or more generally, a Boolean com-
bination of atomic policies. Each (atomic) policy is associated 
wi th a control key, and all the control keys are maintained by the 
key manager. Similar to time-based deletion, the file content is 
encrypted w i th a data key, and the data key is further encrypted 
wi th the control keys corresponding to the policy combination. 
When a policy is revoked, the corresponding control key wi l l be 
removed from the key manager. Thus, when the policy combi-
nation associated wi th a file is revoked and no longer holds, the 
data key and hence the encrypted content of the file cannot be 
recovered w i th the control keys of the policy combination. In 
this case, we say the file is deleted. The main idea of policy-
based deletion is to delete files that are associated wi th revoked 
policies. 
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The definition of a policy varies depending on applications. 
In fact, time-based deletion is a special case under our frame-
work. In general, policies wi th other access rights can be defined. 
To motivate the use of policy-based deletion, let us consider a 
scenario where a company outsources its data to the cloud. We 
consider four practical cases where policy-based deletion wi l l be 
useful: 
• Storing files for tenured employees. For each employee 
(e.g., Alice), we can define a user-based policy “P: Alice 
zs an employee”，and associate this policy wi th all files of 
Alice. If Alice quits her job, then the key manager wi l l ex-
punge the control key of policy P. Thus, nobody including 
Alice can access the files associated wi th P on the cloud, 
and those files are said to be deletec,. 
• Storing files for contract-based employees. An em-
ployee may be affiliated wi th the company for only a fixed 
length of time. Then we can form a combination of the 
user-based and time-based policies for employees' files. For 
example, for a contract-based employee Bob whose contract 
expires on 2010-01-01, we have two policies "Pi ； Bob is an 
employee” and “P2: valid before 2010-01-01”. Then all files 
of Bob are associated wi th the policy combination Pi A P2. 
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If either or P) is revoked, then Bob's files are deleted. 
• Storing files for a t eam of employees. The company 
may have different teams, each of which has more than one 
employee. As in above, we can assign each employee i a 
policy combination P几八 P仏 where and P,2 denote the 
user-based and time-based policies, respectively. We then 
associate the team's files wi th the disjunctive combination 
(Pn A P12) V (P21 A P22) V . • • V (Pm A P^vs) for employees 
1, 2’. . . ’ TV. Thus, the team's files can be accessed by any 
one of the employees, and wi l l be deleted when the policies 
of all employees of the team are revoked. 
• Switching a cloud provider. The company can define 
a customer-based policy “P: a customer of cloud provider 
X,，, and all files that are stored on cloud X are tied wi th 
policy P. I f the company switches to a new cloud provider, 
then it can revoke policy P. Thus, all files on cloud X wi l l 
be deleted. 
Policy-based deletion follows the similar notion of attnhute-
based encryption (ABE) [24’ 6, 11, 22], in which data can be 
accessed only if the corresponding attributes (atomic policies in 
our case) are satisfied. However, policy-based deletion is dif-
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ferent from A B E in two aspects. First, policy-based deletion 
focuses on how to delete data, while A B E focuses on how to ac-
cess data based on attributes. Second, because of the different 
design objectives, a major feature of A B E is to give users the de-
cryption keys of the associated attributes so that they can access 
files that satisfy the attributes, and hence A B E seeks to ensure 
that no two users can collude if they are tied wi th different sets 
of attributes. On the other hand, policy-based deletion does not 
share w i th users any of the decryption keys that are used for 
deletion, but instead such keys are all maintained by the key 
manager. This enables the keys to be appropriately removed in 
the key manager so as to guarantee file assured deletion. Thus 
policy-based deletion has a different design space in contrast 
w i th existing A B E approaches. However, FADE leverages A B E 
to achieve policy-based access control in addition to policy-based 
assured deletion. We explain the details in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 3 
Basic Design of FADE 
We now present the basic design of FADE, a system that pro-
vides guarantees of access control and assured deletion for out-
sourced data in cloud storage. Figure 3.1 illustrates an overview 
of the FADE system. In a nutshell, the cloud hosts data files on 
behalf of a group of users, each of which wants to outsource data 
files to the cloud based on his/her associated file access policies. 
FADE can be viewed as an overlay system atop the underlying 
cloud. I t applies security protection to the outsourced data files 
before they are hosted on the cloud. 
3.1 Entities 
As shown in Figure 3.1, the FADE system is composed of two 
main entities: 
13 
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Key Key Key 
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client ^ ^ J ^ 
、、、、、I 
data Kf^^T^ File 
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data r ^ r ^ 
Isource 刚 f e ^ Cloud 
Figure 3.1: The FADE architecture. Each client (deployed locally with 
its own data source) interacts with one or multiple key managers and up-
loads/downloads data files to/from the cloud. 
• Clients. A client is an interface that bridges the data 
source (e.g., filesystem) of each FADE user and the cloud. 
I t applies encryption (decryption) to the outsourced data 
files uploaded to (downloaded from) the cloud. I t also in-
teracts wi th the key managers to perform the necessary 
cryptographic key operations. 
• Key managers. FADE is built on one or multiple key 
managers, each of which is a stand-alone entity that main-
tains policy-based control keys for access control and as-
sured deletion. These control keys are to protect data keys 
that are used to encrypt data files. The key managers re-
spond to the requests made by different clients and perform 
the necessary cryptographic operations on the control keys. 
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The cloud, maintained by a third-party provider (e.g., Ama-
zon S3 or Windows Azure), hosts data files on behalf of different 
clients. Each of the data files is associated wi th a combination 
of file access policies. We emphasize that we do not require 
any protocol and implementation changes in the cloud to sup-
port FADE. In fact, even a naive storage service that merely 
provides file upload/download operations is also suitable. 
3.2 Deployment 
In our current design, a FADE client is deployed locally w i th 
its corresponding data source as a local driver or daemon. We 
point out that i t is also possible to deploy the FADE client as 
a cloud storage proxy [1], so that i t can interconnect multiple 
data sources. We can use standard TLS/SSL [7] to protect the 
communication between each data source and the proxy. 
In FADE, the set of key managers is deployed as a central-
ized trusted service, whose trustworthiness is enforced through 
a quorum scheme (see Section 3.3). We assume that the key 
managers are centrally maintained, for example, by the system 
administrators of an enterprise that deploys FADE for its em-
ployees. We note that this centralized control is opposed to the 
core design of Vanish [10], which proposes to use decentralized 
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key management on top of existing P2P D H T systems. However, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, there is no straightforward solution to 
develop fine-grained cryptographic key management operations 
over a decentralized P2P D H T system. Also, the Vanish imple-
mentation that was published in [10] is subject to Sybil attacks 
36], which particularly target D H T systems. In view of this, we 
propose to deploy a centralized key management service, anc. 
use a quorum scheme to improve its robustness, as explained in 
Section 3.3. 
3.3 Security Goals, Threat Models, and As-
sumptions 
We now formally state the security properties that FADE seeks 
to achieve in order to protect the outsourced data files. Here, we 
consider an adversary that seeks to compromise the privacy of 
data files. Clearly, FADE needs to properly encrypt outsourced 
data files to ensure that their information is not disclosed to 
unauthorized parties. The underlying assumption is that the 
encryption mechanism is secure, such that i t is computationally 
infeasible to recover the encrypted content without knowing the 
cryptographic key for decryption. In this thesis, we highlight 
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two specific security goals that FADE seeks to achieve for fine-
grained security control: 
• Policy-based access control. A client is authorized to 
access only the files whose associated policies are active and 
are satisfied by the client; and 
• Policy-based assured deletion. A file is deleted (or per-
manently inaccessible) if its associated policies are revoked 
and become obsolete. That is, even if a file copy that is asso-
ciated wi th revoked policies exists, it remains encrypted and 
we cannot retrieve the corresponding cryptographic keys to 
recover the file. Thus, the file copy becomes unrecoverable 
by anyone (including the owner of the file). 
To achieve these security goals, it is necessary to make the key 
management service in FADE robust and secure. We address the 
robustness of key management in FADE from two perspectives. 
First, we assume that each key manager does not keep any 
backup copy of every key that it stores [20], as it is difficult to 
remove all copies of keys of revoked policies (see explanations 
below). To improve robustness, we use a quorum of key man-
agers [26], in which we create N key shares for a key, such that 
any k < N oi the key shares can be used to recover the key. 
Each key manager is a stand-alone entity that is independent 
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of other key managers. While the quorum scheme increases the 
storage overhead of keys, this is justified as keys are generally 
of much smaller size than data files. We explain the details of 
how to implement the quorum scheme in FADE in Chapter 4. 
Second, we assume that the key managers (or at least N -
A: + 1 of them if a quorum scheme is used) reliably remove the 
corresponding control keys of the revoked policies. Suppose in 
the worst case that all key managers are compromised. Then an 
attacker can recover the files that are associated w i th existing 
active policies. On the other hand, files that are associated w i th 
revoked policies sti l l remain inaccessible, as the control keys are 
removed. Hence, assured deletion is achieved. 
In the following, we describe the cryptographic key operations 
in order to achieve the security goals. 
3.4 The Basics - File Upload/Download 
We start w i th the basic design of FADE. To simplify our discus-
sion, we make two assumptions. First, only a single key manager 
is used. Second, before accessing a file, a client needs to present 
authentication credentials (e.g., based on public key infrastruc-
ture certificates) to the key manager to show that it satisfies the 
proper policies associated wi th the files, so that the key manager 
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wil l perform cryptographic key operations. We explain in Chap-
ter 4 how to relax both of the assumptions through multiple key 
managers w i th threshold secret sharing and access control w i th 
attribute-based encryption. 
We now introduce the basic operations of how a client up-
loads/downloads files to / f rom the cloud. We start w i th the case 
where each file is associated wi th a single policy, and then ex-
plain how a file is associated wi th multiple policies in Section 3.6. 
Our design is based on blinded RSA [29] (or blinded deciyp-
t ion [20]), in which the client requests the key manager to de-
ciypt a blinded version of the encrypted data key. I f the associ-
ated policy is satisfied, then the key manager wi l l decrypt and 
return the blinded version of the original data key. The client 
can then recover the data key. The motivation of using this 
blinded decryption approach is that the actual content of the 
data key remains confidential to the key manager as well as to 
any attacker that sniffs the communication between the client 
and the key manager. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the notation used in this thesis. We 
first summarize the major notation used throughout the thesis. 
For each policy z, the key manager generates two secret large 
RSA prime numbers and q, and computes the product n , = 
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Notation Description 
F Data file generated by the client 
K Data key used to encrypt file F 
Pi Policy with index i 
Pi, Qi RSA prime numbers for policy P, (kept secret by the key 
manager) 
rii = known to the public 
(e” di) RSA public/private control key pair for policy P, 
S, Secret key corresponding to policy Pi 
{?Ti}/c Symmetric-key encryption of message m with key k 
R The random number used for blinded RSA 
Table 3.1: Notation used in this thesis. 
PiQi^ - The key manager then randomly chooses the RSA public-
private control key pair (e“dz). The parameters wi l l be 
publicized, while d^  is securely stored in the key manager. On 
the other hand, when the client encrypts a file F, i t randomly 
generates a data key K , and a secret key S^  that corresponds to 
policy P” We let {m}k denote a message m encrypted w i th key 
k using symmetric-key encryption (e.g., AES). We let R be the 
blinded component when we use blinded RSA for the exchanges 
of cryptographic keys. 
Suppose that F is associated wi th policy PI. Our goal here is 
iWe require that each policy i uses a distinct tm to avoid the common modulus attack 
on RSA [16], 
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Cloud Client Key manager 
Pi，，S:‘, {F}^ 
Figure 3.2: File upload. 
to ensure that K , and hence F , are accessible only when policy 
Pi is satisfied. Note that we only present the operations on cryp-
tographic keys, while the implementation subtleties, such as the 
metadata that stores the policy information, wi l l be discussed 
in Chapter 5. Also, when we raise some number to exponents 
Ci or di, i t must be done over modulo n,-. For brevity, we drop 
“mod n , in our discussion. 
File upload. Figure 3.2 shows the file upload operation. The 
client first requests the public key (n,, e,) of policy P, from the 
key manager, and caches (n,, e,) for subsequent uses if the 
same 
policy P, 
is associated wi th other files. Then the client generates 
two random keys K and S” and sends S f ’ and {F}k to 
the cloud^ Then the client must discard K and S^. To protect 
2We point out that the encrypted keys (i.e., { K } s , , S f ) can be stored in the cloud 
without creating risks of leaking confidential information. 
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Cloud Client Key manager 
Figure 3.3: File download. 
the integrity of a file, the client computes an HMAC signature 
on every encrypted file and stores the HMAC signature together 
wi th the encrypted file in the cloud. We assume that the client 
has a long-term private secret value for the HMAC computation. 
File download. Figure 3.3 shows the file download operation. 
The client fetches S-\ and {F}k from the cloud. The 
client wi l l first check whether the HMAC signature is valid before 
decrypting the file. Then the client generates a secret random 
number R, computes i?〜and sends S-' . R^^  = 耶， t o the 
key manager to request for decryption. The key manager then 
computes and returns 临RF个 二 SJI to the client, which 
can now remove R and obtain S” and decrypt {K}S^ and hence 
條 . 
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3.5 Policy Revocation for File Assured Dele-
tion 
I f a policy P, is revoked, then the key manager completely re-
moves the private key d^  and the secret prime numbers p, and � . 
丄 Jius’ we cannot recover Si from S f ’ and hence cannot recover 
K and file F. We say that file F , which is tied to policy P” is 
assuredly deleted. Note that the policy revocation operations 
do not involve interactions wi th the cloud. 
3.6 Multiple Policies 
FADE supports a Boolean combination of multiple policies. We 
mainly focus on two kinds of logical connectives: (i) the con-
junction (AND), which means the data is accessible only when 
every policy is satisfied; and (ii) the disjunction (OR), which 
means if any policy is satisfied, then the data is accessible. 
• Conjunctive Policies. Suppose that F is associated wi th 
conjunctive policies Pi 八 P2 八...八 i^m. To upload F to the 
cloud, the client first randomly generates a data key K , and 
secret keys 5^2’. •.，Sm. I t then sends the following to the 
cloud: { { K } s , } s , . • . s 饥 , S l \ . . 恐 、 a n d { F } k . On 
the other hand, to recover F , the client generates a random 
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number R and sends {S iRY^ 产， . . . ’（S^i?)〜 to the 
key manager, which then returns SiR, S2R,. . . ’ SmR. The 
client can then recover 81,82, • • and hence K and F. 
• Disjunctive Policies. Suppose that F is associated wi th 
disjunctive policies V P,^  V • • • V P,^. To upload F to 
the cloud, the client wi l l send the following: {^}s2'> 
...，{Kkn, 52', S'二 and { F } k . Therefore, the 
client needs to compute m different encrypted copies of K. 
On the other hand, to recover F\ we can use any one of the 
policies to decrypt the file, as in the above operations. 
To delete a file associated wi th conjunctive policies, we simply 
revoke any of the policies (say, Pj). Thus, we cannot recover 
Sj and hence the data key K and file F. On the other hand, 
to delete a file associated wi th disjunctive policies, we need to 
revoke all policies, so that S^/ cannot be recovered for all j. Note 
that for any Boolean combination of policies, we can express it 
in canonical form, e.g., in the disjunction (OR) of conjunctive 
(AND) policies. 
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3.7 Policy Renewal 
We conclude this chapter wi th the discussion of policy renewal. 
Policy renewal means to associate a file wi th a new policy (or 
combination of policies). For example, if a user wants to extend 
the expiration time of a file, then the user can update the old 
policy that specifies an earlier expiration time to the new policy 
that specifies a later expiration time. 
In FADE, policy renewal merely operates on keys, without 
retrieving the encrypted file from the cloud. The procedures 
can be summarized as follows: (i) download all encrypted keys 
(including the data key for the file and the set of control keys for 
the associated Boolean combination of policies) from the cloud, 
(ii) send them to the key manager for decryption, (ii i) recover 
the data key, (iv) re-encrypt the data key wi th the control keys 
of the new Boolean combination of policies, and finally (v) send 
the newly encrypted keys back to the cloud. 
In some special cases, we can simplify the key operations of 
policy renewal. Suppose that the Boolean combination structure 
of policies remains unchanged, but one of the atomic policies P, 
IS changed to Pj. For example, when we extend the contract date 
of Bob (see Section 2.2), we may need to update the particular 
time-based policy of Bob without changing other policies. Then 
9^^mum g b U M t u i • • • i • _111咖__ _ • • _ _ _ 1 _ 通 • _ 
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Cloud Client Key manager 
Figure 3.4: A special case of policy renewal - when policy P, is renewed to 
policy Pj. 
instead of decrypting and re-encrypting the data key w i th the 
control keys that correspond to the new Boolean combination of 
policies, we can simply update the control key that corresponds 
to the particular atomic policy. Figure 3.4 illustrates this special 
case of policy renewal. In this case, the client simply sends the 
blinded version S / "督 to the key manager, which then returns 
SzR- The client then recovers S^ Now, the client re-encrypts 
Si into S f (mod n]), where (n” e]�is the public key of policy 
Pj, and sends it to the cloud. Note that the encrypted data key 
K remains intact. 
Chapter 4 
Extensions of FADE 
We now discuss two extensions to the basic design of FADE. 
The first extension is to use attribute-based encryption (ABE) 
24’ 6’ 11, 22] in order to authenticate clients through policy-
based access control. The second extension is to use a quorum 
of key managers [26] in order to achieve better reliabil ity for the 
-^ey management service. 
4.1 Access Control with ABE 
To recover a file from the cloud, a client needs to request the 
key manager (assuming that only a single key manager is de-
ployed) to decrypt the data key. The client needs to present 
authentication credentials to the key manager to show that it 
indeed satisfies the policies associated wi th the files. One imple-
27 
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mentation approach for this authentication process is based on 
the public-key infrastructure (PKI). However, this client-based 
authentication requires the key manager to have accesses to the 
association of every client and its satisfied policies. This lim-
its the scalability and flexibil ity if we scale up the number of 
supported clients and their associations w i th policies. 
To resolve the scalability issue, attribute-hased encryption 
(ABE) [24, 6, 11, 22] turns out to be the most appropriate so-
lut ion (see Section 2.2). In particular, our approach is based 
on Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [6.. 
We summarize the essential ideas of A B E that are sufficient for 
our FADE design, while we refer readers to [6] for details. Each 
client first obtains, from the key issuing authority of the A B E 
system, an ABE-based private key that corresponds to a set 
of attributes^ the client satisfies. This can be done by having 
the client present authentication credentials to the key issuing 
authority, but we emphasize that this authentication is only a 
one-time bootstrap process. Later, when a client requests the 
key manager to decrypt the data key of a file on the cloud: the 
key manager wi l l encrypt the response messages using the ABE-
based public key that corresponds to the combination of policies 
lAn attribute is equivalent to an atomic policy that we define for policy-based file 
assured deletion (see Chapter 2). 
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associated wi th the file. If the client indeed satisfies the policy 
combination, then it can use its ABE-based private key to re-
cover the data key. Note that the key manager does not have to 
know exactly each individual client who requests decryption of 
a data key. 
FADE uses two independent keys for each policy. The first 
one is the private control key that is maintained by the key man-
ager for assured deletion. If the control key is removed from the 
key manager, then the client cannot recover the files associated 
wi th the corresponding policy. Another one is the ABE-based 
key that is used for access control. The ABE-based private key 
IS distributed to the clients who satisfy the corresponding policy, 
as in the ABE approach, while the key manager holds the ABE-
based public key and uses it to encrypt the response messages 
returned to the clients. The use of the two sets of keys for the 
same policy enables FADE to achieve both access control and 
assured deletion. 
We now modify the FADE operations to include the ABE 
feature as follows. We assume that we operate on a file that is 
associated wi th a single policy. 
File Upload. The fi] -G upload operation remains unchanged 
since we only need the public parameters from the key manager 
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revoke control 
key of P, 
Figure 4.1: Policy revocation with ABE. 
for this operation, and hence we do not need to authenticate the 
client. 
File Download. The file download operation requires authen-
tication of the client. When the client requests the key manager 
to decrypt S f the key manager encrypts its answer S^R wi th 
ABE based on the policy of the file. Therefore, if the client sat-
isfies the policy, then it can decrypt the response message and 
get S J l 
Policy Renewal. Similar to above, the key manager encrypts 
SiR wi th ABE when the client requests it to decrypt the old 
policy. For the re-encryption wi th the new policy, there is no 
need to enforce access control since we only need the public 
parameters. 
Policy Revocation. Here we use a challenge-response mech-
anism in order for the key manager to authenticate the client. 
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Figure 4.1 shows the revised policy revocation protocol. In the 
first round, the client tells the key manager that i t wants to 
revoke policy P” The key manager then generates a random 
number r a s a challenge, encrypts i t w i th ABE that corresponds 
to policy P ” and gives it to the client. Next, if the client is gen-
uine，then i t can decrypt r and send it to the key manager as 
the response to that challenge. Finally, the key manager revokes 
the policy and acknowledges the client. 
4.2 Multiple Key Managers 
We point out that the use of a single key manager wi l l lead to 
the single-point-of-failure problem. An untrustworthy key man-
ager may either prematurely removes the keys before the client 
requests to revoke them, or fail to remove the keys when it is re-
quested to. The former case may prevent the client from getting 
its data back, while the latter case may subvert assured deletion. 
Therefore, i t is important to improve the robustness of the key 
management service to minimize its chance of being compro-
mised. Here, we deploy a quorum of key managers [26], such 
that if there exist any A: < TV key managers that correctly fmic-
tion’ then it is sufficient to perform all required cryptographic 
key operations. 
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Figure 4.2: File upload with multiple key managers. 
In FADE, we need to address the challenge of how to manage 
the control keys wi th i V 〉 1 key managers. For each policy 
Pi, the j t h key manager (where I < j < N) wi l l independently 
generate and maintain an RSA public/private key pair (e小 dy) 
corresponding to a modulus n “ . We point out that this key pair 
is independent of the key pairs generated by other key managers, 
although all such key pairs correspond to the same policy P,. 
Also, each key manager keeps its own key pair and wi l l not 
release it to other key managers. 
Let us consider a file F that is associated wi th policy P” We 
now describe the file/policy operations of FADE using multiple 
.^ ey managers. 
File Upload. Figure 4.2 shows the file upload operation wi th 
multiple key managers. Instead of storing Sp on the cloud as in 
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Figure 4.3: File download with multiple key managers and ABE. 
the case of using a single key manager, the client now splits 5；. 
into N shares, 山 ⑶...，S⑶ using Shamir's scheme. Next, the 
client requests each key manager j for the public key (n”.，e”.). 
Then the client computes S货 ( m o d n ” ) for each j , and sends 
•. •, Se淑,and { F } k to the cloud. Finally, the 
client discards K , S” and S…S仏 . . . ,Su^ . 
File Download. Figure 4.3 shows the file download operation 
wi th multiple key managers. After retrieving the encrypted key 
shares S^f, . • . , s说 from the cloud, the client needs to re-
quest each key manager to decrypt a share. For the j t l i share 
Si? U = 2,. . ., N)^ the client blinds it w i th a randomly gen-
erated number R, and sends S货W ” to key manager j . Then, 
key manager j responds the client wi th S^jR. I t also encrypts 
the response wi th ABE. After unblinding, the client knows 
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Figure 4.4: A special case of policy renewal with multiple key managers and 
ABE - when policy P, is renewed to policy Pj. 
After collecting k decrypted shares of S…the client can combine 
them into S, and hence decrypts K and F. 
Policy Renewal. The policy renewal operation is similar to our 
original operation discussed in Section 3.7. The only difference 
is that the client needs to renew every share of Si. Note that 
in this operation we do not need to combine or split the shares. 
Figure 4.4 shows a special case of renewing a policy P, to another 
Pj (cf. Figure 3.4 in Chapter 3). 
Policy Revocation. The client needs to ask every key manager 
to revoke the policy. As long as at least (TV —A:+ 1) key managers 
remove the private control keys corresponding to the policy, all 
files associated wi th this policy become assuredly deleted. 
Chapter 5 
Implementation 
We implement a working prototype of FADE using C + + on 
Linux. Our implementation is built on off-the-shelf l ibrary APIs. 
Specifically, we use the OpenSSL library [19] for the crypto-
graphic operations, the cpabe l ibrary [31] for the ABE-based 
access control, and the ssss l ibrary [28] for sharing control keys 
to a quorum of key managers. The ssss library is originally 
designed as a command-line ut i l i ty to deal wi th keys in ASCII 
format. We slightly modify ssss and add two functions to split 
and combine keys in binary format, so as to make it compatible 
wi th other libraries. In addition, we use Amazon S3 [3] as our 
cloud storage backend. 
In the following, we define the metadata of FADE being at-
tached to individual data files. We then describe how we im-
plement the client and a quorum of key managers and how the 
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client interacts w i th the clouc. 
5.1 Representation of Metadata 
For each data file protected by FADE, we include the metadata 
that describes the policies associated wi th the file as well as a set 
of cryptographic keys. More precisely, the metadata contains 
the specification of the Boolean combination of policies, and 
the corresponding cryptographic keys including the encrypted 
data key of the file and the control keys associated wi th the 
policies. Here, we assume that each (atomic) policy is specified 
by a unique 4-byte integer identifier. To represent a Boolean 
combination of policies, we express it in disjunctive canonical 
form, i.e., the disjunction (OR) of conjunctive policies, and use 
the characters and to denote the A N D and OR operators. 
We upload the metadata as a separate file to the cloud. This 
enables us to renew policies directly on the metadata file without 
retrieving the entire data file from the cloud. 
In our implementation, individual data files have their own 
metadata, each specifying its own data key. To reduce the meta-
data overhead as compared to the data file size, we can form a 
tarball of multiple files under the same policy combination and 
have all files protected wi th the same data key. 
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5.2 Client 
Our implementation of the client uses the following four function 
calls to enable end users to interact w i th the cloud: 
• U p l o a d C f i l e , p o l i c y ) . The client encrypts the input file 
according to the specified policy (or a Boolean combination 
of policies). Here, the file is encrypted using the 128-bit 
AES algorithm wi th the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode. 
After encryption, the client also appends the encrypted file 
size (which is 8 bytes long) and the H M A C - S H A l signature 
(which is 20 bytes long) to the end of encrypted file for 
integrity checking in later downloads. I t then sends the 
encrypted file and the metadata onto the cloud. 
• D o w n l o a d ( f i l e ) . The client retrieves the file and the pol-
icy metadata from the cloud. I t then checks the integrity 
of the encrypted file, and decrypts the file. 
參 Revoke ( p o l i c y ) . The client tells the key managers to per-
manently revoke the specified policy. A l l files associated 
w i th the policy wi l l be assuredly deleted. I f a file is associ-
ated w i th the conjunctive policy combination that contains 
the revoked policy, then it wi l l be assuredly deleted as well. 
參 R e n e w ( f i l e , new一policy). The client first fetches the 
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metadata for the given file from the cloud. I t then up-
dates the metadata wi th the new policy. Finally, i t sends 
the metadata back to the clouc. 
We export the above function calls exported as l ibrary APIs. 
Thus, different implementations of the client can call the l ibrary 
APIs and have the protection offered by FADE. In our current 
prototype, we implement the client as a user-level program that 
can access files under a specified folder. 
The above exported interfaces wrap the third-party APIs for 
interacting wi th the cloud. As an example, we use L i b A W S + + 
15], a C + + l ibrary for interfacing w i th Amazon S3 using plain 
HTTP. We point out that we can also extend FADE to interact 
w i th different cloud storage services, provided that there are 
APIs that support the basic file upload/download operations 
w i th a particular clouc.. 
5.3 Key Managers 
We implement a quorum of key managers, each of which sup-
ports the following basic functions. 
• Creating a policy. The key manager creates a new policy 
and returns the corresponding public control key. 
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• Retrieving the public control key of a policy. I f the policy is 
accessible, then the key manager returns the public control 
key. Otherwise, i t returns an error. 
• Decrypting a key with respect to a policy. I f the policy is 
accessible, then the key manager decrypts the (blinded) key. 
Otherwise, i t returns an error. 
參 Remkmg a policy. The key manager revokes the policy and 
removes the corresponding keys. 
We implement the basic functionalities of a key manager so 
that i t can perform the required operations on the cryptographic 
keys. In particular, all the policy control keys are buil t upon 
1024-bit blinded RSA (see Section 3.4). Besides, each individual 
key manager supports A B E for access control. 
Chapter 6 
Evaluation 
We now evaluate the empirical performance of our implemented 
prototype of FADE atop Amazon S3. I t is crucial that FADE 
does not introduce substantial performance or monetary over-
head that wi l l lead to a big increase in data management costs. 
In addition, the cryptographic operations of FADE should only 
bring insignificant computational overhead. Therefore, our ex-
periments aim to answer the following questions: What is the 
performance and monetary overhead of FADE? Is i t feasible to 
use FADE to provide file assured deletion for cloud storage? 
Our experiments use Amazon S3 APAC servers that reside 
in Singapore for our cloud storage backend. Also, we deploy the 
client and the key managers wi th in an organization's network 
that resides in Hong Kong. We evaluate FADE on a per-file 
basis, that is, when it operates on an individual file of different 
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sizes. We can proportionally scale our results for the case of 
multiple files. 
6.1 Experimental Results on Time Performance 
of FADE 
We first measure the time performance of our FADE prototype. 
In order to identify the time overhead of FADE, we divide the 
running time of each measurement into three components: 
• file transmission time, the uploading/downloading time for 
the data file between the client and the cloud. 
• rnetadata transmission time, the time for uploading/downloading 
the metadata, which contains the policy information and 
the cryptographic keys associated wi th the file, between 
the client and the clouc.. 
• cryptographic operation time, the total t ime for crypto-
graphic operations, which includes the total computational 
time used for performing AES and HMAC on the file, and 
the time for the client to coordinate wi th the quorum of 
key managers on operating the cryptographic keys. 
We average each of our measurement results over 10 different 
trials. 
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Figure 6.1: Experiment A. l (Performance of file upload/download opera-
tions) . 
6.1.1 Evaluation of Basic Design 
We first evaluate the time performance of the basic design of 
FADE (see Chapter 3), in which we use a single key manager 
and do not involve ABE. 
Experiment A . l (Performance of file upload/download 
operations). In this experiment, we measure the running time 
of the file upload and download operations for different file sizes 
(including 1KB, 3KB, 10KB，30KB, 100KB, 300KB, 1MB, 3MB, 
and 10MB). Figure 6.1 shows the results. 
First, the cryptographic operation time increases wi th the 
file size, mainly due to the symmetric-key encryption applied 
to a larger file. Nevertheless, we find that in all cases of file 
upload/download operations, the time of cryptographic opera-
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION 43 
tions is no more than 0.2s (for a file size within 10MB), and 
accounts for no more than 2.6% of the file transmission time. 
We expect that FADE only introduces a small time overhead in 
cryptographic operations as compared to the file transmission 
time, where the latter is inevitable even without FADE. 
Also, the metadata transmission time is always around 0.2s, 
regardless of the file size. This is expected, since the metadata 
file only stores the policy information and cryptographic keys, 
both of which are independent of the data files. The file trans-
mission time is comparable to the metadata transmission time 
for small files. However, for files larger than 100KB, the file 
transmission time becomes the dominant factor. For instance, 
to upload or download a 10MB file, the sum of the metadata 
transmission time and the cryptographic operation time (both 
are due to FADE) account for 4.1% and 0.7% of the total time, 
respectively. 
We note that the upload and download operations are asym-
metric and spend different times to complete the operations. 
Nevertheless, the performance overhead of FADE drops when 
the size of the data file being protected is large enough, for ex-
ample, on the megabyte scale. 
Experiment A.2 (Performance of policy updates). Ta-
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. . Total Metadata transmission Crypto ops. 
File size — — 
� tmie Download (%) Upload (%) Time (%) 
1KB 0.294s 0.117s 39.9% 0.173s 58.8% 0.004s 1.3% 
10KB 0.268s 0.089s 33.0% 0.176s 65.6% 0.004s 1.3% 
100KB 0.259s 0.083s 32.2% 0.171s 66.3% 0.004s 1.5% 
1MB 0.252s 0.082s 32.7% 0.166s 65.8% 0.004s 1.6% 
10MB 0.275s 0.106s 38.5% 0.165s 60.2% 0.004s 1.3% 
Table 6.1: Experiment A.2 (Performance of policy updates). 
ble 6.1 shows the time used for renewing a single policy of a 
file (see Figure 3.4 in Section 3.7)，in which we update the pol-
icy metadata on the cloud wi th the new set of cryptographic 
keys. We conduct the experiment on various file sizes ranging 
from 1KB to 10MB. Our experiments show that the total time 
is generally small (about 0.3 seconds) regardless of the file size, 
since we operate on the policy metadata only. Also, the cryp-
tographic operation time only takes about 0.004s in renewing a 
policy, and this value is again independent of the file size. 
Experiment A.3 (Performance of multiple policies). We 
now evaluate the performance of FADE when multiple policies 
are associated wi th a file (see Section 3.6). Here, we focus on 
the file upload operation, as we have similar observation for the 
file download operation. We look at two specific combinations of 
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Figure 6.2: Experiment A.3 (Performance of multiple policies). 
policies, one on the conjunctive case and one on the disjunctive 
case. 
Figure 6.2a shows the cryptographic operations time for dif-
ferent numbers of conjunctive policies, and Figure 6.2b shows 
the case for disjunctive policies. A key observation is that for 
each file size, the cryptographic operation time is more or less 
constant (less than 0.22s) within five policies. I t is reasonable to 
argue that the time wi l l increase when a file is associated wi th a 
significantly large number of policies. On the other hand, we ex-
pect that in practical applications, a file is associated wi th only 
a few policies, and the overhead of cryptographic operations is 
sti l l minima'. 
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Figure 6.3: Experiment B.l (Performance of CP-ABE). 
6.1.2 Evaluation of Extensions 
We now evaluate the time performance of the extensions that 
we add to FADE (see Chapter 4). This includes the use of ABE 
and a quorum of key managers. 
Experiment B . l (Performance of CP-ABE). In the file 
download operations, the key manager encrypts the decrypted 
keys wi th the ABE-based key of the corresponding policy (or 
combination of policies) (see Chapter 4). In this experiment, we 
examine the overhead of this additional encryption. We focus 
on downloading a file that is associated wi th a single policy: 
assuming that a single key manager is used. 
Figure 6.3 shows the cryptographic operation time for down-
loading a file wi th CP-ABE and without CP-ABE. We find that 
CP-ABE introduces a constant overhead of 0.06-0.07 seconds, 
which is reasonable. This shows the trade-off between better 
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Figure 6.4: Experiment B.2 (Performance of multiple key managers). 
performance and better security. 
Experiment B.2 (Performance of multiple key managers). 
We now analyze the performance of using multiple key man-
agers. Here, we do not enforce access control wi th ABE, in order 
to focus on the overhead introduced by multiple key managers. 
In particular, we use the 7V-out-of-7V scheme for key sharing, 
i.e., the client needs to retrieve key shares from all key man-
agers. This puts the maximum load on the key managers and 
allows us analyze the worst-case scenario. 
Figure 6.4 shows the cryptographic operation time using dif-
ferent number of key managers. For the file upload operation, 
the cryptographic operation time stays nearly constant (less 
than 0.22s) when the number of key managers increases. For 
the file download operation, the cryptographic operation time 
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Figure 6.5: Experiment B.3 (Performance of multiple policies and multiple 
key managers with CP-ABE). 
only increases by about 0.01s when the number of key managers 
increases from one to five. Again, this value is less significant 
for uploading/downloading larger data files. 
Experiment B.3 (Combining everything together). Lastly, 
we combine multiple policies, CP-ABE, and multiple key man-
agers together. The enables us to understand the maximum 
load of FADE wi th all the available security protection schemes. 
In this experiment, we measure the time overhead when down-
loading a 10MB file wi th different number of policies and key 
managers. We consider the case where all policies are conjunc-
tive. For the multiple key managers, we use the iV_out-of-iV key 
sharing scheme. 
Figure 6.5 shows the cryptographic operation time for each 
case. We find that when turning on CP-ABE, the time of crypto-
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Num. of KMs 
Num. of policies ‘ 5 
1 149 277 405 533 661 
2 282 538 794 1050 1306 
3 415 799 1183 1567 1951 
4 548 1060 1572 2084 2596 
5 681 1321 1961 2601 3241 
Table 6.2: Size of the policy metadata for conjunctive policies (in bytes). 
graphic operations increases almost linearly wi th both the num-
ber of policies and the number of key managers. Even for the 
worst case (five policies and five key managers), the crypto-
graphic operation time is sti l l less than two seconds, which is 
small compared wi th the file transmission time. 
6.2 Space Utilization of FADE 
We now assess the space util ization. As stated in Section 5.1, 
each data file is accompanied wi th its file size (8 bytes), the 
HMAC-SHA l signature (20 byte), and a metadata file that 
stores the policy information and cryptographic keys. For the 
metadata file, its size differs wi th the number of policies and 
the number of key managers used. Here, we analyze the space 
overhead due to the metadata introduced by FADE. 
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Num. of KMs 
. ^ ^ ^ 1 2 3 4 5 
Num. of policies 
1 149 277 405 533 661 
2 298 554 810 1066 1322 
3 447 831 1215 1599 1983 
4 596 1108 1620 2132 2644 
5 745 1385 2025 2665 3305 
Table 6.3: Size of the policy metadata for disjunctive policies (in bytes). 
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 show the different sizes of the meta-
data based on our implementation prototype for a variable num-
ber of (a) conjunctive policies (Pi 八 P2 八…八 Pm)，and (b) dis-
junctive policies (Pi V P2 V • • • V P^). To understand how each 
metadata size is obtained, we consider the simplest case where 
there is only a single policy and a single key manager. Then 
we need: (i) 128 bytes for each share of the policy-based secret 
key S f for policy z, (ii) 16 bytes for the encrypted copy of K 
based on 128-bit AES, (hi) 4 bytes for the policy identifier, and 
(iv) 1 byte for the delimiter between the policy identifier and 
the keys. In this case, the metadata size is 149 bytes. Note that 
in the case of multiple policies, we need to store more policy 
identifiers as well as more cryptographic keys, and hence the 
metadata size increases. Also, the metadata size increases wi th 
the number of key managers (see Section 4.2). This space over-
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Pricing 
Storage (c,) $0.14 per GB 
Data transfer in (q ) $0.10 per GB 
Data transfer out ( c � ) $0.19 per GB with first 1GB free 
PUT requests (cp) $0.01 per 1,000 requests 
GET requests (cg) $0.01 per 10,000 requests 
Table 6.4: A simplified pricing scheme of Amazon S3 in Singapore (in US 
dollars). 
head becomes less significant if the file size is large enough (e.g., 
on the megabyte scale). 
6.3 Cost Model 
We now evaluate the monetary overhead of FADE using a sim_ 
pie pricing model. Here, we use a simplified pricing scheme of 
Amazon S3 in Singapore, in which we assume that our storage 
usage is less than 1TB and our monthly data outbound transfer 
size is less than 10TB. Table 6.4 shows the pricing scheme (as 
of May 2011). 
We estimate the cost of FADE based on Cumulus [32], a 
snapshot-based backup system. In [1], i t is shown that a typical 
compressed snapshot consists of hundreds of segments, each of 
which is around. Here, we assume that our data source has 5 files 
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Without FADE With FADE 
Storage c,-s-f = $0,210 c , - s - ( / + 28 + M(p, TV)) = $0,210 
Data transfer in c^s.f.u = $0,150 CrS-{f+28 + M{p,N))-u = $0,150 
Data transfer out C o ' s - f - d = $0,095 c^ -s - ( /+28 + M(p, A^))-ti = $0,095 
PUT requests c^-s-u = $0,003 = $0,006 
GET requests Cg,s.d = $0,000 Cg-s-2d = $0,001 
Total cost $0,458 $0,462 
Table 6.5: Cost report (in US dollars). 
(segments) and each file is f bytes. Suppose that each segment 
is associated w i th p policies^ and there are N key managers. 
We evaluate the cost when each file is uploaded u times and 
downloaded d times. We denote by M{p, N) the size of the 
metadata. 
Table 6.5 shows the cost reports. To illustrate, we plug in 
some example values as follows. We let s 二 300 and f = 5MB, 
for a total of 1.5GB data. We use 3 conjunctive policies and 3 
key managers. We assume that each file is uploaded once and 
downloaded once. From the table, we can see that the extra cost 
that FADE incurs is less than a cent per month. 
iln Cumulus, each segment may be composed of multiple small files. We assume the 
simplest case that all the files are associated with the same combination of policies. 
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6.4 Lessons Learned 
In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of FADE in terms 
of the overheads of time, space utilization, and monetary cost. I t 
IS important to note that the performance results depend on the 
deployment environment. For instance, if the client and the key 
manager all reside in the same region as Amazon S3’ then the 
transmission times for files and metadata wi l l significantly re-
duce; or if the metadata contains more descriptive information, 
the overhead wi l l increase. Nevertheless, we emphasize that our 
experiments can show the feasibility of FADE in providing an 
additional level of security protection for today's cloud storage. 
We note that the performance overhead of FADE becomes 
less significant when the size of the actual data file content in-
creases (e.g. on the order of megabytes or even bigger). Thus, 
FADE is more suitable for enterprises that need to archive large 
files wi th a substantial amount of data. On the other hand, in-
dividuals may generally manipulate small files on the order of 
kilobytes. In this case, we may consider associating the same 
metadata wi th a tarball of multiple files (see Chapter 5) to re-
duce the overhead of FADE. 
Chapter 7 
Related Work 
In Section 2.1, we discuss time-based deletion in [10, 20], which 
we generalize into policy-based deletion. In this chapter, we 
review other related work on how to apply security protection 
to outsourced data storage. 
Cryptographic protection on outsourced storage. Re-
cent studies (see survey in [14]) propose to protect outsourced 
storage via cryptographic techniques. Plutus [13] is a crypto-
graphic storage system that allows secure file sharing over un-
tmsted file servers. Ateniese et al. [5] and Wang et al [33] pro-
pose an auditing system that verifies the integrity of outsourced 
data. Wang et al [34] propose a secure outsourced data access 
mechanism that supports changes in user access rights and out-
sourced data. However, all the above systems require new pro-
tocol support on the cloud infrastructure, and such additional 
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functionalities may make deployment more challenging. 
Secure storage solutions for public clouds. Secure solu-
tions that are compatible wi th existing public cloud storage ser_ 
vices have been proposed. Yun et al [38] propose a cryptographic 
file system that provides privacy and integrity guarantees for 
outsourced data using a universal-hash based MAC tree. They 
prototype a system that can interact wi th an untrusted storage 
server via a modified file system. JungleDisk [12] and Cumulus 
32] protect the privacy of outsourced data, and their implemen-
tation use Amazon S3 [3] as the storage backend. Specifically, 
Cumulus focuses on making effective use of storage space while 
providing essential encryption on outsourced data. The above 
systems mainly put the protocol functionalities on the client 
side, and the cloud storage providers merely provide the storage 
space. On the other hand, such systems do not consider file 
assured deletion in their designs. 
Access control. One approach to apply access control to 
outsourced data is by attribute-based encryption (ABE), which 
associates fine-grained attributes wi th data. ABE is first intro-
duced in [24], in which attributes are associated wi th encrypted 
data. Goyal et a/. [11] extend the idea to key-policy ABE, in 
which attributes are associated wi th private keys, and encrypted 
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data can be decrypted only when a threshold of attributes are 
satisfied. Pirrett i et a/. [22] implement ABE and conduct empir-
ical studies. Nair et a/. [17] consider a similar idea of ABE, and 
they seek to enforce a fine-grained access control of files based 
on identity-based public key cryptography. Perlman et al [21 
also address how to associate data wi th Boolean combinations 
of policies, but their focus is on digital rights management (i.e., 
access control) rather than file assured deletion. 
Yu et al [37], similar to our work, also seeks to combine as-
sured deletion and access control by allowing attr ibute revoca-
tion in ABE. They require semi-trustable on-line proxy servers 
to be available, such that data is re-encrypted wi th new keys 
upon attr ibute revocation. In our case, we can simply remove 
the policy-based control keys without the need of re-encryption, 
since all policy-based control keys are maintained by centralized 
key servers. We also empirically evaluate the feasibility of our 
system, while [37] mainly focuses on security analysis. 
Assured deletion. There are several related systems on 
assured deletion (which come after our conference paper [30]). 
Keypad [9] protects data in theft-prone devices (e.g., laptops, 
USB sticks) by encrypting such data and maintaining keys in 
an independent, centralized key server, similar to FADE. I t re-
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moves all data of a protected device upon requests of deletion, 
and does not consider fine-grained deletion as in FADE. Nasuni 
announced the support of assured deletion in backup snapshots 
in March 2011 [18]. However, there is no formal study about 
their implementation methodologies and performance evalua-
tion. In our recent work [23], we extend the idea of assured 
deletion to cloud backup systems wi th version control, but the 
work [23] does not consider access control and the use of multiple 
key managers for key management. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
We propose a practical cloud storage system called FADE, which 
aims to provide access control assured deletion for files that are 
hosted by today's cloud storage services. We associate files w i th 
file access policies that control how files can be accessed. We 
then present policy-based file assured deletion, in which files 
are assuredly deleted and made unrecoverable by anyone when 
their associated file access policies are revoked. We describe the 
essential operations on cryptographic keys so as to achieve ac-
cess control and assured deletion. FADE also leverages existing 
cryptographic techniques, including attribute-based encryption 
(ABE) and a quorum of key managers based on threshold secret 
sharing. We implement a prototype of FADE to demonstrate 
its practicality, and empirically study its performance overhead 
when it works wi th Amazon S3. Our experimental results pro-
58 
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vide insights into the performance-security trade-off when FADE 
is deployed in practice. 
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